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## STAFF NOTES:

# Chinese Affairs

State Dept. review completed

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CHINESE AFFAIRS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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## China-Vietnam: The Islands Dispute

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Peking's sensitivity over the security of its southeast flank, as well as its increasing impatience with Hanoi, was vividly illustrated late last month in a sharp *People's Daily* attack on "foreign aggressors" in the South China Sea.

The question of sovereignty over two major island groupings in the area--the Spratlys and the Paracels--has been a major annoyance in Sino-Vietnamese relations since the Chinese took the Paracels from the former Saigon government in January 1974. Both Peking and Hanoi have periodically reiterated their claims to both island groups, but neither side had openly pushed the issue in public. The Chinese even declined to respond to Hanoi's announcement last May that North Vietnamese forces had captured several of the Spratlys--500 miles south of the Paracels--from the former South Vietnam government.

In September, the Chinese turned up the heat on the islands issue just prior to North Vietnam party chief Le Duan's visit to Peking; they publicly reiterated their claims to the disputed islands and recalled for the first time in months the 1974 take-over in the Paracels. Chinese diplomats abroad were also instructed in September to acknowledge the dispute with Hanoi over the islands and to vigorously defend Peking's claims. Moreover, Hong Kong and South China cadre were told that relations with Hanoi were bad and to be prepared for the adoption of a new slogan demanding the return of all the Spratlys to China.

Last month's broadside was by far the toughest Chinese statement on the dispute since early 1974. It amounts to the first direct challenge of Hanoi's claims to the islands and emphasizes the seriousness of Peking's determination to regain all contested islands. The article asserted that China's

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[Redacted]

claims date back 2,000 years and cited archeological and other evidence to support the claims. Chinese sovereignty over all the islands was described as both "sacred" and "inalienable." Peking's demand that all the disputed islands must be returned to Chinese control was juxtaposed with its long-held pledge to "liberate" Taiwan, a clear indication not only of the importance the Chinese attach to their claims, but also a sign that Peking may be prepared to wait some time for a final solution of the issue --as it is in the case of Taiwan.

In an apparent attempt to avoid any confusion about the primary target of Peking's blast, the article employed language that played down the significance of claims other parties have to the Spratly Islands. The Nationalist Chinese claim all of the islands and maintain a military garrison on one, but the *People's Daily* reference to the fact that many of the islands are still not "in Chinese hands" rules out the possibility that Peking was referring to the Nationalist presence there. Peking is doubtlessly confident that Nationalist claims will be resolved when the much larger Taiwan question is settled.

The Philippines also claim some of the islands in the Spratly group. Peking has never made an issue of Manila's claims, however, and, when diplomatic relations between the two countries were established earlier this year, both sides agreed to settle all bilateral disputes without resort to force. Peking seems prepared to put aside the disagreement with Manila.

Although *People's Daily* left no doubt that Hanoi was the major object of its wrath, its attack on Hanoi was implicit: references to Moscow in the blast were explicit and vituperative, leaving no question that Peking believes the Vietnamese are abetting the Soviets in an attempt to expand Russian influence into

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the region. Significantly the article was published only two days after Le Duan returned to Hanoi from Moscow--where he received a much warmer welcome than he had in Peking, gained a Soviet agreement to provide substantial economic aid to North Vietnam, and seconded Moscow's views on detente and on international peace and security. Peking insists that both detente and the recent Helsinki security pact are Soviet "tricks" designed to facilitate what the Chinese see as Soviet "expansionism." Le Duan's endorsement of detente puts Hanoi squarely in Moscow's camp on an issue of major importance to the Chinese and was almost certainly read in Peking as a deliberate provocation.

In fact, the treatment Le Duan received in Peking last September contrasts sharply with the rousing welcome he got in Moscow. There was no joint communique to mark his China visit, and the Hanoi leader failed to tender the normal farewell banquet prior to his departure for home. Moreover, Le Duan went to Peking with the hope of signing several economic aid agreements, including a five-year pact, and there is ample evidence that the Chinese gave less than Hanoi requested. The last working-level Vietnamese negotiator left China in mid-November after three months of talks--without any indication of further progress. His departure virtually rules out the possibility of any additional economic agreements between the two parties, at least for the time being.

The Chinese clearly see a correlation between Hanoi's increasing tilt toward Moscow and the long-range possibilities for Soviet "meddling" through Vietnam in the South China Sea, as well as Southeast Asia generally. It also is apparent that the Chinese consider control of islands in the area vitally important to their security. The *People's Daily* article, in fact, refers to the region as "an important gate of China" and to the islands as located on major shipping lanes.

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For their part, the Soviets have been sharply critical of the Chinese seizure of the Paracels. Since early 1974, Moscow has routinely attacked China's claims to all of the islands and its use of force in the Paracels. The Soviets, however, have stopped short of providing outright support to Hanoi's counterclaims. Soviet maps still show the islands as belonging to China, although recent press comments have implied that they were Vietnamese. A Soviet official recently said Moscow considers the status of both island groups as "undetermined." Peking ignored these attacks until last week. Then, the *People's Daily* article asserted that the Soviet Union, throwing aside earlier support for China's claims, mounted a "venomous" assault on Peking after the Paracels incident.

Peking's long-term concerns almost certainly hinge on its view of Soviet intentions and activities. Chinese leaders also seem persuaded, however, that in the shorter run Hanoi could unilaterally disrupt their hopes of developing a bloc of friendly countries along China's southern border. The Chinese and Vietnamese share very few common perceptions of Southeast Asia. They are clearly on opposite sides in the current dispute between Thailand and Laos. Hanoi has vigorously defended the Lao side and has launched frequent attacks on Thai "aggression." Peking, on the other hand, has remained relatively quiet on the subject, privately lobbying for a peaceful solution to the disagreement and encouraging improved relations between the two countries. The Chinese have been by far the largest contributors to Cambodian reconstruction since the communists took over there last spring. Peking has also made it clear that it was on Cambodia's side in the border dispute with North Vietnam and apparently encouraged the Cambodian Communists to open diplomatic relations with Thailand.

On the Sino-Vietnamese border itself, there [redacted]  
local-level Chinese

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[redacted]

cadre are being advised to stand firm in the face of alleged Vietnamese attempts to "occupy" Chinese territory. Although these putative border incidents have not been confirmed and there is very little likelihood that a serious border dispute will develop, the fact that the Chinese continue to talk about such incidents suggests that Peking is determined to maintain a degree of anti-Vietnamese feeling along the border.

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The Tachai Campaign: Provincial  
Returns Come In

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Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping reportedly described the September-October "learn-from-Tachai" conference as the most important meeting held in China since the communist take-over. While Teng was obviously engaging in hyperbole, his remark underlines the importance that has been accorded to the Tachai campaign in the last few months. Tachai now overshadows this year's two other major campaigns--strengthening proletarian dictatorship and criticizing the classical novel "Water Margin." Reporting on virtually every organization in China is now in terms of learning from Tachai.

[redacted] this mass campaign will be further broadened with the convening of a series of national meetings on other economic sectors and on culture. A national coal conference has already been held.

Most provinces have held a series of mass rallies and other meetings to publicize the major addresses at the conference by vice premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng, and to send off youths and cadres to rural areas. The New China News Agency reported on November 25 that over one million cadres from 12 provinces had already gone to communes to engage in manual labor and to direct production.

Most of these cadres appear to be from the hsien (county) level, although a number of provincial and prefectural leaders have also gone to the country-side. The function of the latter cadres seems to be to ensure that local cadres perform their duties with the necessary zeal. Morale among local cadres has been badly shaken by a series of purges and campaigns dating from the Cultural Revolution and their reputation has been tarnished by publicity accorded to examples of corruption, sexual indiscretions, and a

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[redacted]

lack of initiative. Domestic propaganda has made it clear that the hsien, and especially the hsien-level party committee, is the key level in administering the campaign. Indeed, cadre rectification at the hsien level and below is one of the major themes of the campaign.

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rural cadres are already apprehensive over the potential threat implied by "rectification," and the moderate leadership in Peking and in the provinces will have to monitor the campaign carefully lest criticism of cadres leads to a rekindling of factional animosities and the frustration of campaign goals.

On the whole, however, significant progress has been made in curbing factionalism and increasing production this year. Hong Kong leftists were told that Teng said that the key to success in agricultural work was reliance on old cadres. Recent provincial rotations and new appointments seem to confirm that Peking holds this view. Veteran cadres such as Fukien First Secretary Liao Chih-kao are reportedly cracking down hard on factionalism and have transferred a number of noncompliant cadres. On the other hand,

[redacted] while workers are finally back in the factories in Kunming and minority unrest has abated, new First Secretary Chia Chi-kun has not succeeded in getting the workers to increase production.

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The Tachai campaign already seems to be the most clearly defined and well-orchestrated campaign since the Cultural Revolution. Given its scope, ambitious goals, and rising volume of rhetoric, there is at least some danger that things could get out of hand. But if current moderate leaders remain healthy and in agreement and can successfully manage the campaign with other efforts to correct trouble spots in the economy, fairly impressive gains may well be in the offing.

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Leadership Notes

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Two top leaders have recently reappeared after significant absences. Chiang Ching was present on December 1 at the meeting and picture taking session between President Ford and Chinese head of state Chu Te. Her last appearance was on October 15 at the closing session of the national Tachai conference in Peking. Chiang's political power has been sharply diminished this year, and her appearances now seem to be under the control of regime moderates and designed to promote an image of unity. In the past, Madame Mao tended to punctuate periods of nonappearances with public activities that were designed to raise rather than lower political tensions. Her association with the Tachai meeting was obviously meant to present a united front for this major undertaking--

[redacted] the circulation of a central document on the Tachai movement that hails the example of Chiang and Teng Hsiao-ping who took time off from the meetings to engage in manual labor. Her presence at the meeting with President Ford is designed to convey the same message--the support of the political left for Sino-US relations.

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The other reappearance was Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying, who headed the Chinese representation at the Peking celebrations of Albanian national day on November 29. Yeh had not appeared since October 25 and is widely rumored to be ill. Surprisingly, Yeh did not see President Ford even though he played an important role in past meetings with ranking US officials. Yeh's place seems to have been taken by another Chou En-lai stalwart, Vice Premier and leading economic specialist Li Hsien-nien.

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France: No Plums for Sauvagnargues

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French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues' five-day visit to China last month was apparently less than a total success from the French point of view.

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[redacted] Exploratory talks during Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to Paris last spring had apparently progressed to the point where French officials felt that Sauvagnargues would be able to wrap up negotiations on at least some sales so that formal signing ceremonies could take place during President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's scheduled trip to Peking early next year.

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The Chinese, however, were apparently not in a buying mood. The French foreign minister told reporters that he had been unsuccessful in his efforts at reopening talks on the Concorde. Chinese claims that French prices were "not competitive" indicate that discussions on other sales were equally unproductive. Officials in Sauvagnargues' party admitted that the only concrete result of the visit was an agreement to expand cultural exchanges.

Despite their apparent disinclination to break any new economic ground with Sauvagnargues, the Chinese did express general satisfaction with Sino-French relations--indicating that if President Giscard d'Estaing's visit does not produce any pleasant economic surprises neither will it be marred by any unpleasant political disagreements. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua restated familiar anti-detente, anti-Soviet themes

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[redacted] Conflicting assessments

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[Redacted]

on Korea--which the Chinese held was not an urgent problem--were also glossed over.

Both sides placed far more emphasis on congruent views on such matters as the need for European military and economic cooperation. Peking used the occasion of Sauvagnargues' visit--coming as it did soon after the Rambouillet summit and before the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation--to voice support for European efforts at easing economic confrontation with the Third World. Peking has long believed that further hardening of the confrontation would work to Moscow's advantage and sees Paris--with its strong residual ties to former colonial clients--as having a special role to play in promoting compromise between developed and developing nations. A *People's Daily* editorial published a week before Sauvagnargues' arrival in Peking stands as the most explicit Chinese endorsement yet of the establishment of a "Second World - Third World" dialogue. [Redacted]

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The Modernization of Bureaucracy in the PLA

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The Chinese are concerned about overstaffing in the PLA bureaucratic structure, but this may apply more to the lower levels than the upper reaches. Central Directive 18, which was issued in the summer and calls for modernization of the military, makes pejorative reference to an excessive number of officers in the PLA. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping has also chastised the army for having too many staff positions and reportedly cited Mao as saying that all PLA staff organizations below the division level should be abolished. Such criticism may be related to talk in Fukien about a new military regulation specifying that each unit should have only one commander and one deputy commander. There is some evidence that an excessive number of officers in field units has often resulted in contradictory orders.

In light of renewed emphasis on professionalism in the PLA, those cut loose may be working in a non-combat role. Indeed, a broadcast from Kansu in late September praised a regiment which reduced the staff of its political department. The cadres were sent down to work at the company level and engage in productive labor.

The "Learn from Tachai" campaign also seems to be draining off quite a few officers. Hunan Military District recently "transferred" 30 percent of its cadres to Tachai-related work. In addition, 40 percent of the cadres in the military subdistrict and garrisons and 50 percent of the cadres in the people's armed forces departments were sent off to the countryside. It is unclear at this point whether these personnel are on a short-term rotational assignment or for a longer term. The Tachai campaign, however, probably has a certain amount of appeal to the military districts as a means of satisfying Peking's pressure for a reduction of staff slots.

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While the lower levels of the army may be trimming their bureaucratic fat, the military structure at the higher echelons may be expanding. Most striking is the increase in the number of deputy chiefs of staff and deputy directors of the General Political Department/General Logistics Department.

	Number before Cultural Rev- olution	Number at Present	Number added since Central Directive #18
General Staff Department (deputy chiefs)	8	9	0
General Political Department (deputy directors)	4	6	3
General Logistics Department (deputy directors)	5	13-22	3-6

A significant number of these appointments have been made since Central Directive 18 was issued in July, which suggests that the document's concern about overstaffing is not applicable at this level. It is also quite possible that this staffing process has not yet concluded. Furthermore, the unusually heavy turnout at national day of personnel from the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission and the military academies indicates Peking's increasing interest in enlarging the staffs concerned with the technical aspects of warfare.

In addition to an increase of personnel, there is also limited evidence pointing to the formation of some new staffs. [redacted]  
"advisory groups" have been attached to important units in the central military structure. The groups

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are reportedly authorized to make inspections and offer suggestions, but are not empowered to issue orders. Lo Jui-ching is said to have been appointed chief of the advisory group appended to the General Staff Department, and Chen Tsai-tao has been brought to Peking to serve on this group. Presumably these groups are concerned with purely military affairs. This report seems to jibe with the grouping of Lo and Chen together in the National Day name list. Their placement on the list seemed to put them in a category by themselves, not clearly identified with any particular military body or responsibility. In the area of strategic planning, a new directorate may have been established recently to plot strategic and development plans for the future.

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[ ] Lo Jui-ching heads this unit.

These tenuous indicators of a new staffing pattern gives some indication of how Central Directive 18 is being implemented. It seems likely that a major effort to upgrade the professional quality of the PLA would call forth more and larger staffs at the higher planning levels of the military establishment. Professionalization tends to demand specialization. This process in time will probably have implications for the PLA's role. As modernization moves forward and the army's command structure continues to expand, pressure from within this structure may well be generated to reduce the PLA's involvement in activities which do not contribute to military proficiency.

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## Afternoon Chats in Hong Kong

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Fei I-min, publisher of the PRC owned *Ta Kung Pao*, recently engaged in a tour d'horizon of the Chinese leadership over lunch with US diplomats in Hong Kong. Fei sometimes tailors his remarks to suit his audience and is not a totally reliable source; nonetheless, he does have access to a good bit of information concerning the relationships of regime leaders.

Fei began by noting that the health of the long hospitalized Premier Chou En-lai had improved and that he was seeing his private secretary and "making decisions." Fei is a strong Chou supporter, and his remarks must be taken with a grain of salt. While Chou might have improved a little, he is not likely to resume an active day-to-day administrative role.

More interesting and possibly more accurate were Fei's remarks concerning Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching, who was recently transferred from the top party post in Kwangsi to the same post in Kwangtung. Wei was alleged to have had a long and intimate relationship with ranking Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, and the Hong Kong publisher implied that Teng was behind the transfer (see following article). Wei is now the second Politburo member to be stationed in Canton--Hsu Shih-yu was moved there in the rotation of regional commanders in late 1973. If Wei, who is the first political commissar of the Canton Military Region, is close to Teng, his transfer implies that the relationship between Teng and Hsu may leave something to be desired. Wei could become the most potent political figure in South China.

[redacted] Wei's ranking deputy will replace him as first party secretary in Kwangsi, which suggests that Wei will retain considerable influence there.

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Also of note were Fei's reservations about Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao. Despite the fact that Chang is 63, Fei considered him too young and inexperienced, but admitted that Chang is exercising a great deal of responsibility. While Fei was obviously expressing his personal views, his feelings may be shared by some Chou supporters in Peking. Fei added that Chang had a close relationship with Hsu Shih-yu, whose former command bordered Shanghai, but this assertion seems to be at variance with the animosity between the two during the Cultural Revolution. Fei went on to note that Chang had military and administrative ties to the late foreign minister Chen I, who like Teng was a Szechuanese--a statement that seemed designed to imply a linkage between Chang and Teng Hsiao-ping.

After standard remarks about several other top leaders, Fei dropped one last bit of inside information. Politburo member Chi Teng-kuei, whose political fortunes have been rising slowly but steadily in the last few years, was alleged to have been chief of the party office responsible for coordination between the party and the government in 1973. Fei added that this amounted to liaison between Mao and Chou. If true, such service would obviously have been of benefit to Chi and may help explain his rising power. However, Fei did not remark on any links between Chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, which would seem to be the potentially most rewarding personal political tie to have at the present. [redacted]

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The Kwangsi Connection

*Ta Kung Pao* publisher Fei I-min's assertion that Party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping and new Kwangtung First Secretary Wei Kuo-ching have had a long and intimate relationship adds weight to a large body of circumstantial evidence pointing in the same direction. That Wei and Teng have long known each other seems indisputable; in 1930 the two helped to organize the 7th Chinese Peasants' Red Army in Kwangsi. They were survivors of the force that eventually joined Mao in the Kiangsi soviet in 1931. Both took part in the Long March (1934-35) but joined different units; Teng went with Liu Po-cheng while Wei joined Chen I's forces.

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Following the Communist victory in 1949, Wei became mayor of Fuchou, while Teng assumed more substantial national and regional posts. The two may have had an opportunity to work together briefly in 1950.

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Teng was the first secretary of the East China Bureau in the first six months of 1950 before going to the newly formed Southwest Bureau headquartered in Chungking. Wei remained a relatively obscure official until 1954 when Teng, by then a vice premier, became secretary general of the party. In that year Teng apparently played a major role in the purge of Politburo member Kao Kang and Organization Department Director Jao Shu-shih, alleged co-conspirators in an anti-party plot. Wei, who was identified between early 1953 and late 1954 only as a commander of public security forces, may have assisted Teng in the investigation of the conspiracy. Wei's election to governor of Kwangsi in 1955, just before the plot was announced, may in part have been linked to that event. Teng, who has a reputation for bringing friends up on his own coattails, may have been a major sponsor of Wei for his first important provincial assignment.

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In 1957, following two years of crop failures, Wei survived the dismissal of three top Kwangsi officials accused of mishandling relief grain. The defense that Wei was out of the province during the period cannot be refuted but seems flimsy; his survival suggests high-level support in the party, perhaps from Teng. As his survival of the Cultural Revolution attests, Wei undoubtedly has had well-placed backers other than Teng, but Teng's influence seems paramount. Teng moreover, has championed minority causes, and Wei is from the Chuang minority. In his report on the 1953 Electoral Law and the 1957 Report on the Rectification Campaign, Teng made major allowances for minorities. In the 1957 speech he advocated a moderate approach to settling minority problems--a stance criticized during the Cultural Revolution.

Teng's support of Wei may have been returned in kind. Wei, who joined the Politburo in August 1973, four months before Teng was reinstated, has been in a position to support an old ally's resurgence to power while simultaneously advancing his own career.

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Setbacks on the Arabian Peninsula

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Although the Chinese have not yet commented publicly, Peking undoubtedly views recent Soviet military dealings on the Arabian Peninsula as blows to China's own regional interests.

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The Chinese will regard any Russian arms sale to Kuwait more as a symbolic setback than as a major gain in regional influence for the Soviets. Peking knows from its own dealings with the Kuwaitis that they are not interested in what Moscow is selling ideologically. Kuwait--with its massive oil revenues--can fill its military shopping list without having to accept any political strings from Moscow. Still, the symbolic stakes are such that Peking would unquestionably be pleased if the current Soviet-Kuwaiti negotiations fall through.

If the sales do materialize, Peking's propagandists will undoubtedly cite them as evidence of Soviet efforts to fuel the regional arms race in general and the border dispute between Kuwait and Iraq in particular. Peking has been working hard to undercut Moscow's influence in Baghdad--a major

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recipient of Soviet military assistance--and Russian sales to Kuwait would clearly facilitate such Chinese efforts.

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Chinese leaders probably take a much darker view of the movement toward closer Soviet military ties with the two Yemens. The Chinese have themselves paid more attention to the two mutually antagonistic regimes since the reopening of the Suez Canal earlier this year: Aden and Sana share control over the Arabian side of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait through which all shipping between the Canal and the Indian Ocean must pass. Coupled with recent French moves toward granting independence to the faction-ridden French Territory of the Afars and Issas--occupying the opposite side of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait--and the steadily increasing Soviet naval presence in neighboring Somalia, Moscow's maneuvering in the Yemens can only have heightened Chinese paranoia over Soviet designs for military dominance in the area and broader Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean.

Peking has clearly been banking on closer regional economic, political, and military cooperation by moderate forces in the area--such as Saudi Arabia and Iran--to dilute Soviet influence with the Yemenis.

[Redacted] Saudi policy toward North Yemen, however, was a prime factor in President Hamdi's decision to seek more military aid from Moscow, and a Chinese official in Sana recently made no secret of his government's consternation over this counterproductive Saudi role. The official made a direct linkage between the Soviet arms deal and President Hamdi's displeasure over the abortive Saudi effort last month to mediate between Sana and conservative North Yemeni tribal leaders. The Chinese official blamed the US for not warning Riyadh of the "probable effects" of such Saudi "intervention in internal" Yemeni affairs.


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There may also be more subtle considerations behind the Chinese bitterness. Peking was clearly encouraged by the brief thaw in relations between Sana and Riyadh this summer and may have been looking to the day when President Hamdi could have been used as an intermediary to gain Peking an opening with the new Saudi leadership. China is well aware that escalated oil prices have given Saudi Arabia increased economic and political clout, and Peking has been seeking some means of breaking ground with the staunchly anti-communist Saudis. Any Chinese hopes of working through Sana have been dashed by the renewed freeze in Saudi - North Yemeni relations.

The Chinese almost certainly view the renewed Soviet military deliveries to the maverick regime in South Yemen as a reversal of what Peking has regarded heretofore as a favorable trend of events. The recent improvement in relations between South Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the visit to Aden this spring by World Bank President MacNamara--which the Chinese read as a sign of more moderate US views toward South Yemen--and the winding down of the Aden-supported Dhofar rebellion in neighboring Oman, all fit well with China's own quiet efforts to promote reconciliation and cooperation among the region's moderates and radicals. While the recent Soviet military assistance to Aden probably does not portend any resurgence of activity by the Dhofar rebels, it does carry the risk of a wider conflict between South Yemeni and Omani units along the border. Moreover, Aden's increased willingness to deal with Moscow may prove to be an obstacle to any further moves toward rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.

While all of this cuts the wrong way from Peking's outlook, Chinese options for countering the Soviet initiatives in South Yemen--or in Sana--are limited. China has long been unwilling and--in terms of its ability to match sophisticated Soviet

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equipment--unable to compete in the field of military assistance. Peking does contribute substantial amounts of economic assistance to both countries and may increase such aid somewhat to sharpen the impact of its anti-Soviet blandishments. In large part, however, the Chinese will have to continue to depend on less radical Arab states to prevent further Soviet entrenchment on the peninsula, a prospect that is probably unsettling to Peking in light of the recent events there.

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CHRONOLOGY

- November 9      French atomic energy delegation arrives in Peking at invitation of the Academy of Sciences; feted by Vice Premier Hua Kuo-feng on November 23; departs for home November 24. [redacted] 25X1
- November 20      Chinese journalism delegation arrives in Paris: meets with Prime Minister Chirac on November 21. [redacted] 25X1
- November 21      26th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Albanian relations celebrated with considerable fanfare in both Peking and Tirana. [redacted] 25X1
- Scientific delegation begins tour of Austria and Italy. [redacted] 25X1
- November 22      Chinese advance team arrives in Japan to open consulate general in Osaka. [redacted] 25X1
- November 22-23    Chu Te sends official condolences on death of Franco; congratulates Juan Carlos on his proclamation as King of Spain. [redacted] 25X1
- November 23      French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues departs Peking following last-minute meeting with Teng Hsiao-ping. [redacted] 25X1
- November 24      Peruvian trade delegation arrives in Peking; feted by Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang; new trade agreement negotiated which includes provisions for export of 75,000 tons of rice to Peru. [redacted] 25X1

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November 24	Rwandan education delegation begins tour of China.	[redacted]	25X1
November 25	Surinam congratulated on independence; official message sent in name of Chou En-lai.	[redacted]	25X1
	Chinese representative Lai Ya-li addresses UN General Assembly plenary session on Soviet interference in Angola.	[redacted]	25X1
	Trade delegations depart for Cuba, Iraq.	[redacted]	25X1
	Panamanian Women's group arrives in Peking; Bolivian youth group departs.	[redacted]	25X1
November 26	Sri Lankan trade delegation arrives in Peking, greeted by Minister of Trade Li Chiang. Trade protocol signed on November 30.	[redacted]	25X1
November 28	Korean Workers Party delegation, led by central committee member Kim Huan, arrives in Peking; welcomed by International Liaison Department Chief Keng Piao.	[redacted]	25X1
December 1	Chinese industry and trade delegation arrives in Singapore for "friendly" visit.	[redacted]	25X1
December 1-5	President Ford visits China.	[redacted]	25X1

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